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Joella Roland* 
The Hang-Up with Hamburg: How Center for Food 
Safety v. Hamburg will Alter the Food Industry 
Between 2006 and 2010, six highly publicized outbreaks of food borne illnesses 
occurred, resulting in fourteen deaths.1 In 2008, a critically-acclaimed documentary 
portrayed the majority of the food industry as appallingly full of profit-hungry 
corporate giants willing to sacrifice the quality of their food and the health of the 
American people for lower costs.2 It was in this climate that, on January 4, 2011, 
President Obama signed the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) into law.3 This 
act dictated that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implement certain food 
industry regulations by specific deadlines, which the FDA failed to meet.4 Frustrated 
by the FDA’s inability to adhere to these deadlines, the Center for Food Safety filed 
suit to compel the FDA to do so, resulting in Center for Food Safety v. Hamburg.5 
The court followed a recently-developed portion of case law, and compelled the 
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 1. James Andrews, Salmonella and Peanut Butter: Victims’ Stories, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/12/salmonella-and-peanut-butter-victims-stories/#.UjtQgRYY20t; David 
Brown, Egg Recall Spreads to Second Iowa Producer, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/20/AR2010082005649.html; FDA Finalizes Report on 2006 Spinach 
Outbreak, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press 
Announcements/2007/ucm108873.htm; Investigation of Outbreak of Infections Caused by Salmonella Saintpaul, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Aug. 25, 2008, 9:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/ 
saintpaul/jalapeno/; Update on Salmonella Outbreak and Peter Pan Peanut Butter and Great Value Peanut Butter, 
US FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements 
/2007/ucm108848.htm; Saundra Young, Salmonella Outbreak Linked to Alfalfa Sprouts, CNN HEALTH (Dec. 24, 
2010, 5:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/12/23/salmonella.outbreak.sprouts/index.html. 
 2. Dan Purnell & Paul Ashigbie, Movie Review: Food Inc. – Directed by Robert Kenner Oscar, THE 
MOVEMENT, http://www.bu.edu/themovement/past-issues/spring2011/foodinc/ (last visited Sep. 23, 2013).  
 3. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/default.htm (last updated Sep. 17, 2013).  
 4. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). 
 5. 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). 
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FDA to adhere to specific deadlines.6 In so doing, the court threw the needs of an 
entire $4.8 trillion industry by the wayside.7 
This comment examines the specific ways the food industry8 and small 
businesses will be negatively impacted by the decision.9 Part I provides the legal 
background, including information about FSMA along with the Hamburg case facts 
and reasoning.10 Part II gives information about the Administrative Procedure Act 
both as a whole and as it relates to Hamburg, explains why the case was correctly 
decided according to recent unreasonable delay case law, and the detrimental effects 
of the case from the erosion of the administrative principles regarding this new 
precedent.11 Part III describes the adverse effects of the decision based on the 
deadlines promulgated.12 Part IV delves into the specific effects this case will have on 
small businesses.13 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Food Safety Modernization Act 
FSMA, signed into law in January 2011, is the most complex food safety legislation 
since the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.14 Through expansion of the FDA’s 
responsibility and authority, FSMA seeks to modernize food regulations and change 
the focus to preventing food borne illness – not just reacting to outbreaks.15 The act 
tasks the FDA with creating fifty new rules, planning and conducting studies, 
 
 6. Id. at 972. 
 7. Sarah Murray, The World’s Biggest Industry, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2007, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/2007/11/11/growth-agriculture-business-forbeslife-food07-cx_sm_1113bigfood.html. 
 8. The phrase the food industry includes all entities involved in the production and consumption of food 
and beverages, including producers and processors of food crops and animals, companies that develop and sell 
the tools used for farming and transporting food, and food vendors. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW 
THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 11 (2002).  
 9. Although there is no universal definition for a small business, I use the phrase to refer to a business that 
has less than 20 employees and has less than $500,000 in revenue. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, METHODOLOGY 
TO IDENTIFY SMALL BUSINESSES AND THEIR OWNERS 2 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/OTA-T2011-04-Small-Business-Methodology-Aug-8-2011.pdf; 
Jason Keith, State of the Union Furthers Small Business Misperception (Jan. 26, 2013 8:28 AM), 
http://www.boston.com/business/specials/small_business_blog/2012/01/state_of_the_union_furthers_small_bu
siness.html. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. Susana Richardson et al., The Food Safety Modernization Act and the FDA Facility Registration Program, 
U. FLA. IFAS EXTENSION 1,1 (2013), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/FS/FS23100.pdf. 
 15. Conference Report, FDLI Food Safety Conference: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Putting 
Ideas into Action (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/ 
UCM254885.pdf; FSMA Proposed Rule for Produce Safety, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
Food/guidanceregulation/FSMA/ucm334114.htm (last updated Dec. 5, 2013). 
RolandPP2.4EIC (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  6:23 PM 
 Joella Roland 
Vol. 9, No. 2 2014 359 
writing reports to Congress, and developing a series of guidance documents aimed 
at educating food manufacturers about its expectations.16 Part 1 describes the basic 
areas that FSMA revolves around.17 Part 2 describes the entities that are exempt 
from FSMA.18 
1. The Fundamental FSMA Focus Areas 
The fundamental FSMA focus areas are “prevention, inspections compliance and 
response, enhanced partnerships, and import safety.”19 FSMA seeks to achieve its 
goal of preventing foodborne illness through requiring food-processing facilities to 
perform a written analysis of any current or foreseeable hazards both naturally and 
artificially occurring that could affect the facility.20 The facility puts the result of this 
analysis in writing, develops scientifically sound and continually monitored hazard 
prevention strategies, and constructs and implements procedures for corrective 
action should preventive control fail.21 In addition, the facility must maintain 
records of this entire process for at least two years.22 Another provision within the 
prevention focus area is the provision requiring “minimum standards for the safe 
production and harvesting of . . . fruits and vegetables.”23 This extensive compulsory 
provision encompasses “soil . . ., hygiene, packaging, temperature controls, animals 
in the growing area, and water.”24 The FDA is required to make a bi-annual 
determination of the most significant foodborne contaminants and publish 
contaminant-specific guidance documents for handling them.25 
In order to meet the goal of inspection compliance and response, FSMA 
mandates that the FDA inspect food facilities, targeting those that are high risk. 
Specifically, it requires the FDA to inspect domestic facilities regularly with high-
risk facilities inspected more often than lower risk facilities.26 The inspection of 
foreign facilities is not based on risk, but on a quota of total facilities that the FDA 
must inspect.27 FSMA gives the FDA the authority to issue mandatory recalls when 
 
 16. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Meeting on the Food Safety Modernization Act: Focus on Preventive 
Controls for Facilities 27, 40 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/ 
UCM253612.pdf (hereinafter “Focus on Preventive Controls”; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Implementation of 
FSMA, http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm247556.htm (last updated July 5, 2013). 
 17. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 19. Focus on Preventive Controls, supra note 16, at 27, 40.  
 20. Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012). 
 21. Focus on Preventive Controls, supra note 16, at 27, 40.  
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. 21 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
 26. Focus on Preventive Controls, supra note 16, at 27, 40. 
 27. Id.  
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unsafe food enters the marketplace.28 In addition, the FDA has augmented record-
keeping requirements for tracking high-risk foods.29 
FSMA addresses the focus area of import safety in several ways. First, FSMA 
requires importers to verify that their “foreign suppliers have adequate preventive 
controls in place to ensure” safe food production.30 Second, the importers must 
have their processes in writing, and meet the requirements of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.31 Third, the FDA may require food importers to provide a 
certification that the article of food complies with FSMA.32 Food importers who 
agree to higher safety standards will receive expedited review and food entry.33 
The theme of partnership is woven throughout the implementation of the Act. 
Although the FDA is the agency driving FSMA, FSMA explicitly mandates that FDA 
strengthen partnerships with other government agencies to improve the United 
States food safety system.34 Specifically, the FDA is required to “leverage and 
enhance the food safety and defense capacities of state and local agencies” and 
develop a plan to expand similar capacities of foreign governments.35 In addition, 
FSMA authorizes the FDA to work with state and other local agencies to complete 
the inspections required under FSMA.36 
2. The Exceptions to FSMA 
There are two main exceptions incorporated within FSMA. The first exception is 
the Tester-Hagan Amendment, which gives foreign and domestic farms that fall 
within the FDA definition of a small business that harvest low risk produce, and 
those that are engaged in direct-farm marketing (at least 50% of total farm sales are 
made directly to consumers or restaurants in the same state or 275 miles away)37, a 
variance from the minimum standards for the safe production and harvesting 
requirements.38 Small to very small businesses get more time to comply with the 
standard, and farms that engage in direct-farm marketing get a complete 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. 21 U.S.C. § 2223 (2012). The FDA is required to establish a product tracing system to trace 
contaminated food in the United States following the establishment of a pilot project to evaluate different 
product tracing methods. Id. 
 30. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/UCM263773.pdf (last updated July 12, 2011).  
 31. Food Safety Modernization Act; Effect on States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/agriculture-and-rural-development/food-safety-modernization-act.aspx. 
 32. 21 U.S.C. § 384a (2012). 
 33. Id. FSMA lists factors to be used in evaluating whether importers are eligible. Id. 
 34. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, (July 12, 2011), 
www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/UCM263773.pdf.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3903–04 (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 419). 
 38. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). 
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exemption.39 Small businesses get more flexibility in having to perform hazard 
analysis and risk-based preventative controls, and very small businesses get a 
complete exemption.40 
Another exception built into FSMA is for food importers.41 The produce 
requirement mandates that food importers receive a variance from FSMA’s 
requirements when the foreign country determines that a variance is necessary 
based on local growing conditions.42 In order to receive a variance, the procedures 
that would be followed need to be as “reasonably likely” to protect the public health 
as those under the produce requirement.43 This request for a variance must be 
submitted in writing to the FDA, describe the type of exception requested, and 
provide information about the safety of the variance.44 
B. Case Facts 
Center for Food Safety v. Hamburg45 developed when Center for Food Safety, a non-
profit organization that works to curtail the use of “harmful food production 
technologies,”46 sued the FDA commissioner for the FDA’s failure to follow FSMA 
deadlines.47 The seven sets of regulations that the FDA failed to promulgate include: 
regulation for science-based minimum standards for hazards and safe production 
and harvesting of produce; activities that constitute on-farm packing, holding, 
manufacturing, or processing; protections against intentional adulteration of food; 
requirements for food transporters to use sanitary transportation practices; 
protections for neutrality of third party audits; and the Foreign Suppler Verification 
Program.48 
The Center for Food Safety argued that the court had jurisdiction to compel the 
agency to follow these deadlines pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).49 The Center for Food Safety sought a declaratory judgment stating that the 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012); Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3998. 
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). 
 42. Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption, 78 
Fed. Reg. 54, 48637 (Mar. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 16 & 21), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/UCM360734.pdf [hereinafter Standards for 
Produce].  
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). 
 44. Id.  
 45. 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013).  
 46. About Center for Food Safety, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (2014), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/ 
about-us. 
 47. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
 48. Id. at 966–67. The Foreign Supplier Verification Program will require food importers to run a risk-
based analysis of their suppliers to ensure that they comply with FSMA. 21 U.S.C. § 384a (2012). 
 49. Complaint at 3–8, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 
CV 12 4529 DMR). 
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FDA failed to meet deadlines and an injunction compelling the agency to meet the 
deadlines.50 The FDA argued that because the deadlines under FSMA were “self-
executing,” the court did not have jurisdiction to review the agency action.51 The 
FDA relied on precedent where the Court stated that judicial review is precluded 
when the statute contains “no judicially manageable standards.”52 In addition, the 
FDA argued that the FSMA deadline was unachievable given the FDA’s limited staff 
and the large amount of rules in the same general subject area.53 
Another APA question that was at issue was whether or not APA required the 
reviewing court to issue an injunction when statutory deadlines are violated or if the 
court has discretion about whether or not to do so.54 The FDA argued that the court 
does have discretion, basing its conclusion on older precedent that takes into 
account multiple factors when deciding if courts need to issue an injunction when 
statutory deadlines are violated.55 The Center for Food Safety argued that the court 
did not have discretion because the ability of the courts to take into account 
multiple factors only applies in the absence of statutory deadlines.56 
The court ruled for the plaintiff, holding that the FDA violated FSMA and APA, 
and granted a declaratory judgment and injunction.57 The court held the new 
deadlines would depend on a joint written statement from both parties setting forth 
new deadlines.58 The court stated that if the two parties were unable to reach 
mutually acceptable deadlines, the court would issue its own arbitrary deadlines.59 
After the case was adjudicated, the parties were unable to reach an agreement.60 
They submitted competing proposals, so the court was required to develop its own 
deadlines.61 The court ordered the FDA to publish all proposed regulations by 
November 30, 2013, close the comment period no later than March 31, 2014, and 
publish the final regulations by June 30, 2015.62 A month after this decision was 
rendered, the FDA filed a motion for reconsideration or an order staying the 
judgment for two out of the seven areas of regulation: intentional adulteration and 
 
 50. Id. at 8–9. 
 51. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 20–22, Ctr. for Food Safety v. 
Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012), (No. CV 12 4529 DMR). 
 52. Id. at 20 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
 53. Id. at 8. 
 54. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). 
 55. Id. at 970.  
 56. Id. at 970–71. 
 57. Id. at 972. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 1, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 
June 21, 2013), (No. CV 12 4529 DM). 
 61. Id. at 1, 3.  
 62. Id. at 3. 
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sanitary transport.63 The court granted the motion for the regulations regarding 
sanitary transport, and extended the FDA’s deadline for the proposed regulations 
and comment period for this area of regulation to sixty days.64 However, the 
deadline for the final regulation remains unchanged.65 
After the court issued its opinion regarding FDA’s motion for reconsideration, 
the FDA filed a motion for a stay pending an appeal for the court’s granting of an 
injunction compelling the FDA to issue a proposed rule regarding protection 
against intentional food adulteration by the court’s deadline.66 However, the court 
denied this motion, leaving the results of the court’s previous opinion unaffected.67 
C. The Court’s Reasoning 
The court based its decision to issue an injunction on APA precedent, which 
required courts to compel agency action when agencies act in violation of statutory 
deadlines. The first case the court quoted in support of this conclusion is Forest 
Guardians v. Babbitt,68 which holds that when agencies fail to adhere to statutory 
deadlines, a reviewing court must compel the action.69 The second case is 
Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Badgley,70 which holds that the balancing of 
multiple factors is not permitted when congressional deadlines are provided.71 
Biodiversity holds that the test for determining whether equitable relief should be 
granted in the case of a statutory violation is “whether an injunction is necessary to 
effectuate the congressional purpose behind the statute.”72 Using this test, the court 
held that an injunction is necessary in this case.73 The reason for this is that since 
Congress intended the regulations to be implemented by certain dates, in order to 
effectuate the congressional purpose, deadlines must be implemented.74 
In Hamburg, the court decided to have the FDA and Center for Food Safety try 
to work out their own deadlines with the looming threat of court-issued arbitrary 
 
 63. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 12-CV-04529 PJH, 2013 WL 4396563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2013). 
 64. Id. at *4. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 12-CV-04529 PJH, 2013 WL 5718339, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 
2013). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 69. Id. at 1187–89. 
 70. 309 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 71. Id. at 1177 n.11. 
 72. Id. at 1177 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)). The court balances its approach by bringing 
up In re Barr Labs., Inc., which held that courts have discretion in deciding whether or not to compel the agency 
to adhere to statutory deadlines. 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court does not explicitly refute the In re 
Barr Labs., Inc. holding, but simply lists the case name and holding and moves onto an analysis under the 
Biodiversity conclusion. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). 
 73. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 971. 
 74. Id. 
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deadlines, should the parties not be able to work out deadlines within four weeks.75 
The court came to the conclusion that the parties should work out their own 
deadlines since both parties agreed about the purpose of FSMA.76 The court stated 
that the issuing of deadlines would be consistent with the underlying purpose of 
FSMA since Congress signaled that the rulemaking be closed-ended.77 
Following the inability of the parties to agree on deadlines, the court issued its 
own deadlines, which were universal to all of the undeveloped regulations within 
FSMA.78 The court’s deadlines were not those promulgated by either party.79 In 
issuing their deadlines, the court rejected the FDA’s proposal to issue target 
timeframes, rather than binding deadlines.80 The court reasoned that Congress had 
intended for the rulemaking process to be closed-ended, which was not adequately 
reflected with the idea of target timeframes.81 The court criticized the Center for 
Food Safety’s deadlines as being “overly restrictive” for such complicated tasks and 
giving inadequate time for comment, in light of the interests at stake with FSMA.82 
As a result, the court issued deadlines in-between those proposed by the two 
parties.83 
The court proceeded to, in large part, deny the FDA’s motion for 
reconsideration and order staying the judgment based on the FDA not meeting the 
appropriate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard, as interpreted by the Ninth 
Circuit.84 Another reason the court gave for denying the FDA’s motion is its 
previously-stated position that Congress intended for the rulemaking process to be 
closed-ended.85 Nonetheless the court agreed to grant an extension of the deadlines 
for the proposed rule and comment period for sanitary transport because the 
Center for Food Safety had agreed to allow the FDA this extension.86 The court 
 
 75. Id. at 972. 
 76. Id. at 971–72. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 1, 3, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. 
Cal. June 21, 2013), (No. CV 12 4529 DM). 
 79. Id. at 2–3. 
 80. Id. at 2. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 2–3. 
 84. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12–4529 PJH, 2013 WL 4396563, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2013). The Ninth Circuit interprets the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 59(e) and 60(b), to 
require a change in law, evidence, or fact, to prevent injustice, to appropriately navigate unusual conditions, or 
any other reason that justifies relief. Id. at *1–2 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (2011); 
Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1044 (2001)). Without going into any detail, the court concludes that the case 
did not meet any of these circumstances. Id. at *4. The court cites the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
requirement that stays require that an appeal be filed before a stay can b granted. Id. Since the FDA has not filed 
an appeal, the court denies the FDA’s stay. Id. 
 85. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12–4529 PJH, 2013 WL 4396563, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2013). 
 86. Id. 
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rejected the FDA’s motion to stay pending appeal the deadline for the intentional 
adulteration proposed rule based on the FDA’s failure to meet the relevant Supreme 
Court’s promulgated factors for granting a stay.87 
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
A. Overview of The Administrative Procedure Act 
APA is a federal statute that allows for lawsuits against federal agencies for actions 
“made reviewable by statute and final agency action” where there is no other 
judicial remedy.88 It was enacted in 1946 with four primary objectives: define the 
scope of judicial review, allow for public participation in the rulemaking process, 
require agencies to keep the populace informed, and prescribe uniform standards of 
conduct proceedings.89 Sections 701 to 706 define the scope of judicial review, 
which the Court has interpreted to include “a broad spectrum of administrative 
actions” and a presumption in favor of judicial review that can only be overcome by 
“clear and convincing evidence” of a conflicting legislative intent.90 
Section 706(1), specifically, allows for judicial review of administrative actions 
when they are unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld.91 A number of cases 
have found that if the court finds that the actions meet one or more of these 
conditions, the court is required to issue an injunction to compel the agency to 
follow the applicable statute.92 However, other courts have found that, as advocated 
by the FDA, the court can exercise judicial discretion regarding whether to issue an 
 
 87. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12-4529 PJH, 2013 WL 5718339, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 
2013) (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Wisconsin Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d. 669, 674 
(D.C. Cir. 1985)). The factors for granting of a stay are: (1) whether petitioner has made a strong showing that 
she is likely to succeed, (2) whether petitioner will be irreparably injured absent a stay, (3) whether issuance of 
stay will substantially injure the other parties’ interest, and (4) where the public interest lies. Id. at *1 (citing 
Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776). The court focuses its analysis on the first two factors, stating that neither factors three 
or four “add much to the analysis in this case” and that the first two factors are the most important. Id. at *2–3. 
The court holds that the FDA did not make a “strong showing” that it is likely to succeed since there was no 
argument that the court applied the wrong standard in its previous ruling and the FDA’s arguments do not 
eliminate the court’s ability to provide an injunction. Id. The court holds that the factor of the petitioner being 
irreparably injured was not met in this case since the FDA could use the comments received in the public 
comment period to collect more information before promulgating a final rule and that the FDA could file 
another motion if it runs out of time prior to the issuance of its final rule. Id. at *2. 
 88. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  
 89. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § I 
(1947). 
 90. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967).  
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 92. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 260 n.7 (1986) (noting that the court could compel agency 
action if it is unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld). The exception to this rule is if the action is barred 
by a congressional moratorium on spending for that purpose. Forest Guardians v. Babbit, 174 F.3d 1178, 1187 
(10th Cir. 1999); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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injunction if there is unreasonable delay or unlawful withholding of an action by an 
agency.93 
B. The Administrative Procedure Act in Hamburg 
In Hamburg, the court followed the path advocated by the Center for Food Safety, 
which is reliant on a recently developed body of unreasonable delay case law. One 
case, on which the Hamburg court relies when determining that a court must issue 
an injunction compelling the agency to follow the applicable statutory deadlines, is 
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt,94 which centers around a deadline imposed by the 
Endangered Species Act.95 The statute required the then Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, to issue a final regulation within one-
year of the publishing of a proposed regulation.96 However, Babbitt failed to do this 
in the instance of a proposed rule listing the Rio Grande silvery minnow as 
endangered and designating its “critical habitat.”97 As a result, two non-profit 
organizations brought suit to compel Babbitt to make the designation within thirty 
days since the statutory deadline had already passed.98 In response, Babbitt stated 
that it was impossible for him to meet the deadline due to a lack of available 
resources.99 
The court found for the plaintiffs, holding that the relevant portion of APA does 
not give them discretion in deciding whether or not to compel an agency to adhere 
to statutory deadlines.100 The relevant portion states: “the reviewing court shall—(1) 
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”101 The court 
came to this conclusion through looking at a number of different factors. The first 
factor is recently-developed case law, which interprets the word “shall” to imply a 
mandatory decision.102 The second factor is Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt, 
which compelled Babbitt to follow a statutorily imposed deadline.103 The third 
factor is a straightforward plain reading of the terms “unreasonably delayed” and 
“unlawfully withheld” to distinguish between the two of them.104 
 
 93. Telecomm. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Sierra Club, 2013 
WL 1955877, at *1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 94. 174 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999).  
 95. Id. at 1181. 
 96. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012); Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1181–82. 
 97. Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1182. 
 98. Id. at 1181–82. 
 99. Id. at 1182. 
 100. Id. at 1187–88, 90, 93.  
 101. Id. at 1187 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)). 
 102. Id. at 1187. 
 103. Id. at 1188–89. 
 104. Id. at 1190.  
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The court waived away Babbitt’s defense that a lack of resources precludes 
following the statutory deadlines.105 The court stated that it did not have a choice in 
enforcing the statutory deadlines since it believes APA precludes the traditional 
balancing test done by courts.106 In addition, should adhering to the court-
mandated deadlines be impossible, Babbitt could prove this during a contempt 
proceeding.107 For the aforementioned reasons, the court held that APA did not 
afford any discretion to the court, thus requiring that it issue an injunction to 
compel Babbitt to follow the statutory deadlines.108 
Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC)109 is the principal 
case that the FDA relied on when arguing that reviewing courts have discretion 
about whether or not to issue an injunction in the face of an agency that violates 
statutory deadlines.110 Under TRAC, the court articulated several factors that courts 
should take into account when deciding if courts should compel agency action 
because of unreasonable delays.111 These factors are used by other courts to make 
the same determination.112 However, the situation in TRAC had a material 
difference from that of Hamburg: there were no statutory deadlines imposed.113 
C. Adverse Consequences from Hamburg’s Erosion of Traditional Administrative Law 
The Hamburg court decided to follow the more recently-promulgated body of 
unreasonable delay case law, resulting in the determination that the court had no 
discretion to decide whether or not to compel an agency to adhere to statutory 
deadlines,114 which has resulted in an erosion of traditional administrative law. The 
Hamburg court primarily relied on the unreasonable delay case law from the more 
recently-decided Forest Guardians v. Babbit115 in coming to its decision, rather than 
 
 105. Id. at 1192. 
 106. Id. at 118788, 9091. 
 107. Id. at 1192–93.  
 108. Id. at 1193.  
 109. 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 110. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 8, 12–14, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 
2d 965 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013), (No. CV 12 4529 DM). 
 111. Telecommunications Research and Action Center, 750 F.2d at 80. The six factors are: if agencies use “rule 
of reason” with their timeline, whether there is a timetable in the statute, whether the delay has an impact on 
human welfare, whether expediting agency action would have an effect on agency’s competing priorities, the 
nature of the interests prejudiced by the delay, and whether there is any impropriety behind the lagging 
timeline. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (using the TRAC 
factors to determine if the court should compel the Food and Drug Administration to action); Bemba v. Holder 
930 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1029–35 (E.D.Mo. 2013) (using the TRAC factors to determine if delay in adjudicating 
citizenship status was reasonable). 
 113. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 73. 
 114. See supra Part I.C. 
 115. 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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the more established TRAC factor test.116 By choosing to follow Forest Guardians, 
rather than the more established case law by the circuit with administrative law 
expertise, the Hamburg court contributed to a material change in case law.117 
The first eroded administrative law principle is that courts and Congress should 
give administrative agencies a fair amount of deference.118 By not affording the FDA 
discretion, despite the rational basis for its delay, the Hamburg court eroded this 
administrative principle. Even if we ignore the fact that the deadlines set forth in the 
law did not take into account 2012119 and 2013120 FDA budget cuts and a 
government shutdown,121 the deadlines did not afford enough time for the FDA to 
implement the regulations.122 For example, the act gave the FDA 270 days from the 
passage of the bill to establish pilot projects to explore and evaluate methods to 
rapidly and effectively identify recipients of food.123 The goal behind this was to 
prevent or mitigate a foodborne illness outbreak and to address credible threats of 
serious adverse health consequences or death, resulting from the food being 
adulterated or misbranded.124 By contrast, the pilot programs mandated under the 
Railroad Safety Improvement Act (RSIA), a consumer protection law passed 
around the same time as FSMA, gave the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
two years to create a pilot program.125 The discrepancy between these two timelines  
 
 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 103–117. 
 117. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE PROBLEMS AND CASES 67 
(4th ed. 2010) (stating that the D.C. Circuit “has been recognized as having expertise in administrative law”). In 
addition, several statutes require those seeking judicial review of agency action to bring suit in the District of 
Columbia. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 119. E.g., House Cuts FDA Budget by $285 Million!, ALLIANCE FOR NATURAL HEALTH (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.anh-usa.org/house-cuts-fda-budget-by-285-million/.  
 120. E.g., Associated Press, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg: 2013 Budget Cuts Means Less Safe Food, 
POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/fda-commissioner-margaret-
hamburg-2013-budget-cuts-mean-less-safe-food-88241.html.  
 121. E.g., Jessica Hartogs, Voices of the Shutdown: “I Had Everybody Cancel,” CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2013, 6:45 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/voices-of-the-shutdown-i-had-everybody-cancel/.  
 122. In addition, the FDA does not have the resources to implement FSMA. E.g., KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BUILDING DOMESTIC CAPACITY TO 
IMPLEMENT THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT 10 (2013) (demonstrating that the FDA believes it 
needs more money to effectively implement the law). Requiring the FDA to not only implement FSMA, but to 
do so on a strict time frame is unrealistic. See, e.g., Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 271, 279–80 (2011) 
(discussing how agencies often do not meet statutory deadlines, which forces agencies to implement a wide 
ranging scheme when they do not have the resources to meet congressional requirements “willfully ignore[s] 
reality”). 
 123. 21 U.S.C. § 2223a(1) (2012). 
 124. Id. 
 125. 49 U.S.C. § 21109e(1) (2012). 
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shows just how short the timeline for implementing FSMA is.126 
The discrepancy in the two timelines is exacerbated by the fact that the FSMA 
pilot programs are much more expansive than those under RSIA. RSIA establishes 
two pilot programs.127 The goal of one program is to evaluate the efficacy of 
communicating to employees notice of their assigned shift time 10 hours prior to 
the beginning of their assigned shift, as a method for reducing employee fatigue.128 
The goal of the other program is to evaluate the efficacy of requiring certain 
railroads to assign employees to defined unscheduled call shifts followed by shifts 
not subject to call, as a method for reducing employee fatigue.129 These narrowly 
focused pilot programs not only mean less agency time spent figuring out what 
direction the pilot program should take, but less time and resources implementing 
the program. In addition, RSIA allows some of the requirements to be waived.130 By 
contrast, FSMA does not allow for the waiving of requirements, which means more 
time and resources are necessary to make sure the program adheres to the 
requirements listed in the statute. 
Court decisions that modify established case law have adverse implications for 
industry since businesses are harmfully impacted whenever traditional 
administrative law is modified. The reason for this is that changes in case law foster 
uncertainty.131 Understanding and stability are particularly important when dealing 
with new regulations businesses are going to be subject to in order to avoid 
overwhelming their resources.132 
This erosion is also significant for policy reasons. Since our common law system 
is built on examining the results of other cases, lawyers rely on the results of the 
other lawsuits when deciding whether or not to file potential lawsuits. Accordingly, 
when potential litigants see that courts are willing to second guess the expertise of 
administrative agencies, as the court has done in Hamburg, they may become more 
likely to file lawsuits against administrative decisions. This not only increases the 
 
 126. The unworkableness of the pilot program deadlines can also be seen when comparing them to the 
deadlines of other FDA pilot programs. See, e.g., Drug Supply Chain Security Act, Pub. L. 113–54 (2013) 
(codified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 360eee-360eee–4) (not giving a deadline for the establishment of a pilot program); 
Drug Supply Chain Security Act Implementation Plan, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/drugintegrityandsupplychainsecurity/drugsupplychainsecurityact/ucm382
022.htm (stating target time frame for pilot program will be determined in the future).  
 127. Id. 
 128. 49 U.S.C. § 21109e(1) (2012). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Changes in administrative law make it unclear how courts are going to rule next, which leads to 
uncertainty for businesses. See, e.g., JAMES R. ATWOOD ET AL., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 
19:21 (3rd ed. 2011).  
 132. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38–39 (2nd ed. 1969) (stating legal stability and knowledge 
of legal obligations are essential to avoid frustrating private and public goals).  
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potential for litigation, but it undermines agency authority and puts the court in a 
position to make decisions that it does not have the expertise to make.133 
Another eroded administrative law principle is that of refraining from arbitrary 
behavior.134 Although, there has not been one main definition of arbitrary espoused 
by the courts,135 one definition that has been consistently used is one meaning 
“irrational, not based on reason.”136 Not only did the Hamburg court concede that 
the deadlines it imposed were arbitrary, but the deadlines promulgated were not 
based on rational considerations, such as how the FDA is going to effectively 
implement regulation with insufficient funds and periods of agency shutdown and 
how the industry was going to adequately prepare for the regulation.137 
IV. THE DISASTROUS IMPLICATIONS OF HAMBURG FOR INDUSTRY 
The Hamburg decision has numerous negative implications for the food industry 
ranging from increased costs for businesses to inhibiting the investing and 
marketing success of firms. Part A describes how the Hamburg decisions will likely 
lead to increased costs,138 and part B goes into the myriad of other implications and 
their reasons.139 
A. The Ways Hamburg will Likely Lead to Increased Costs for the Food Industry 
Although the court promulgated deadlines that are in between those proposed by 
the two parties, they are nonetheless unrealistic. A random sampling of federal 
agency rulemaking from 2005 and 2006 found that rulemakings only began after 
the agency extensively surveyed practices and consulted with industry experts.140 In 
these cases, most rulemakings were nowhere near as extensive, novel, and complex 
as FSMA, and did not require that federal agencies coordinate with other federal  
 
 
 133. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE PROBLEMS AND CASES 64 (4th ed. 
2010) (stating that the problem with the judiciary ordering agencies to make a decision within a prescribed 
period of time is that courts are not in a position to asses agency priorities). 
 134. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 135. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative Law can’t be 
Defined and what this Means for the Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 839 (2010) (stating that no standard 
definition of arbitrariness is possible). 
 136. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56–57 (1983); 
Bowman Transp., Inc v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974). 
 137. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013).  
 138. See infra Part A. 
 139. See infra Part B. 
 140. Letter to Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.capmkts 
reg.org/pdfs/2010.12.15_Rulemaking_Timeline_Letter.pdf.  
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agencies and state governments.141 The court’s timeline fails to take these differences 
into account and its unreasonable timeline prevents the FDA from doing the 
necessary work to promulgate its regulations. The court’s June 21st injunction 
ordered the FDA to publish all proposed regulations five months later on 
November 30th.142 Clearance by the Office of Management and Budget is included 
in this deadline,143 which by itself, can take over a year.144 
When unrealistic deadlines are imposed on already overburdened agencies- not 
only are the agencies frustrated, but resources that could be spent on tasks such as 
reviewing petitions and applications and issuing necessary permits and certificates 
for manufacturers and importers are taken away.145 This is directly applicable to 
Hamburg. Since the food industry has not been regulated this extensively before or 
in this manner, it is impossible to prove this based on food-regulation; however, 
looking to other FDA-regulated industries provides a good indication about how 
certain types of regulations will affect industry.146 One such area is the prescription 
drug industry. In both the prescription drug and the food industries, the FDA 
currently has a backlog of petitions and applications.147 In the case of prescription 
drugs, FDA backlogs have led to extended wait times for necessary paperwork and 
 
 141. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 4.15 (2005) (detailing the straightforward process for requesting certain records), 
with 78 Fed. Reg. 64834 (proposed Oct. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 507.100) (enumerating the 
ambiguous recording requirements, including cross references to different parts of the code and unclear 
definitions). 
 142. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 3, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 
June 21, 2013), (No. CV 12 4529 DM). 
 143. Id. at 2–3. 
 144. See, e.g., Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Reviewmaking under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 
46 (1984) (noting that the Office of Management and Budget spent over a year reviewing an Environmental 
Protection Agency regulation on air quality standards for particulates). 
 145. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 161 (1995) (stating that unrealistic deadlines 
frustrate the agency and that resource costs associated with deadline litigation may be high); Alden F. Abbott, 
Case Studies on the Costs of Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 475 (1987) 
(providing an example of how unrealistic an EPA deadline resulted in wasted costs that threatened to 
undermine the quality of necessary registration program). 
 146. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm247559.htm (detailing how FSMA changes the way 
and extent the food industry has been regulated). 
 147. H.R. REP. NO. 104-436, pt. II, IV. (1995) (stating that the FDA has a backlog of food additive petitions 
and applications), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt436/html/CRPT-104hrpt436.htm; 
June Gibbs Brown, Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Citizen Petition Process, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL i, 3 (1998) (stating that FDA has a backlog of 250 
petitions), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/phs/c9750002.pdf ; Alaric Dearment, GDUFA Tackles 
Backlog of Drug Approval Applications, DRUG STORE NEWS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://drugstorenews.com/article/ 
gdufa-tackles-backlog-drug-approval-applications-fda-hires-more-staff (stating that FDA has a backlog of  
generic drug approval applications).  
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skewing of the industry in favor of larger more established companies.148 Resources 
that are currently being spent defending against deadline litigation and helping the 
FDA meet these deadlines could be spent mitigating the backlog.149 This 
encouragement of other potential litigants could further add to the FDA’s petition 
and application backlog. In addition, these results are exacerbated since the FDA 
does not believe it has enough funding or time to implement the law effectively.150 
The augmentation of the backlog of applications and petitions could result in 
more fees for the industry, which is exactly what happened with the prescription 
drug industry.151 The existence of the backlog, coupled with the lack of agency 
resources, caused the levying of a substantial fee on prescription drug companies to 
help the FDA mitigate the backlog.152 Not only is the regulation of the prescription 
drug industry similar to the food industry, but there is also a lack of FDA resources 
dedicated to the food industry regulation.153 The recent passage of a bill that would 
charge industry a fee to reduce the FDA’s backlog shows that Congress is not 
opposed to passing fees for FDA-regulated industries, which makes it more likely 
that fees could be levied on the food industry to mitigate the application and 
petition backlog.154 
Another adverse effect of Hamburg is that the decision forces businesses to come 
into compliance faster than they would have had to if the Food and Drug 
Administration’s desired deadlines had prevailed. This faster compliance time 
means businesses have to spend more money to ensure they adhere to the 
 
 148. H. Rep. No. 104-436, at 4 (1995); Aaron Smith, FDA Backlog = Billions for Big Pharma, CNNMONEY 
(Apr. 10, 2006 9:26 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/10/news/companies/fda_backlog/.  
 149. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F.Supp.2d 965 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013), (No. CV 12 4529 DM) (stating that the FDA has already begun to prioritize FSMA 
rulemaking); Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 Admin. L. Rev. 549, 562 (1989) (using interviews with federal 
employees to prove her point that a federal agency has prioritized fulfilling court orders with its limited 
resources and put other programs on the backburner).  
 150. KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
BUILDING DOMESTIC CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT 10 (2013) (showing 
the FDA believes it needs more money to effectively implement the law); Reply in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 12–13, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013) (No. CV 12 
4529 DM).  
 151. 138 CONG. REC. S17234-03 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (joint statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy and Orrin 
Hatch) (stating that this bill will help reduce the backlog of applications);138 CONG. REC. H11730-01 (daily ed. 
Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. William Richardson) (stating that the fee act will begin to address the backlog 
of prescription drug approvals); Standard Costs for Components of the Process for the Review of Human Drug 
Applications, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Sep. 11, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/ 
PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm093484.htm (detailing what the substantial fees are to mitigate the backlog). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g., National Research Council, CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA 14–15 (2007). 
 154. Digest for S.622, GOP.GOV, http://www.gop.gov/bill/113/1/s622 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (describing 
how recently-passed S. 622 would help mitigate the FDA backlog).  
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regulations.155 Since Hamburg required faster implementation of FSMA’s 
regulations, it means that businesses will have to modify their business strategies 
before they would otherwise have needed to. These financial impacts are quite large 
impact given the substantial cost FSMA will have on the industry.156 FDA estimates 
the produce regulations, by themselves, will cost domestic farms between $4,967.19 
and $30,566.23 per farm, depending on the farm’s size.157 
In addition, since the regulation will be in effect for a longer period of time than 
it would be without this lawsuit, this means that there is more time for it to have its 
adverse effects on the industry and businesses that depend on farmers and food 
manufacturers and importers, such as restaurants and grocery stores. Basic 
economics state that when a business has a higher cost it will typically pass on this 
higher cost to the consumer.158 In this case, other players in the supply chain use the 
goods, which will result in higher costs for them.159 These businesses will likely pass 
on their higher costs to consumers who could be starting businesses of their own.160 
This effect is not just a basic economics principle, but has proven to be true when 
the cost of producing foods has risen in recent years.161 Since FSMA threatens to 
increase the cost of food industry basics, FSMA will likely increase the cost of food 
to potential entrepreneurs.162 
B. Hamburg’s Other Implications for the Food Industry 
The Hamburg decision compels the FDA to develop FSMA’s regulations in a shorter 
time frame than it feels comfortable with, which could lead to a myriad of adverse 
effects stemming from the increased likelihood that the FDA’s regulations will be 
 
 155. Industry fees are billed annually, so the longer the bill is in effect the more times the fees have to be 
paid. See 21 U.S.C. § 379j –31 (2012). 
 156. Helena Bottemiller, Merrigan Expresses Worry About FSMA’s Impact on Agriculture, FOOD SAFETY NEWS 
(May 24, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/merrigan-expresses-worry-about-fsmas-impact-to-
agriculture/#.Uw0sf_12-0s. 
 157. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Analysis of Economic Impacts: Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing 
and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption 317–18 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/UCM334116.pdf. 
 158. See Jonathan S. Masure & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 579, 610 (2012).  
 159. See, e.g., A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law Update: The FDA Food Safety 
Modernization Act, Obesity and Deceptive Labeling Enforcement, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 145 (2011) (stating 
how almond regulation has been passed down from handlers to producers and adds costs on domestic 
industry). 
 160. See, e.g., Kelly M. Gay, Note, Hunger, Food Prices, and the Food Safety Modernization Act: Balancing 
Physical Safety and Food Security, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1377, 1396 (2013).  
 161. Julie Jargon et al., Higher Food Prices Start to Pinch Consumers, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 
2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB119932361635363833 (stating how higher costs has, in 
part, led to increased cost of foods to consumers). 
 162. FSMA: Comment on FDA’s Proposed Food Safety Regulations by November 15 Deadline, FARM-TO-
CONSUMER LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/news_wp/?p=12806 (stating 
that consumers will face increased food prices as a result of FSMA). 
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flawed.163 The first such effect is increased cost of compliance and inefficiencies, 
which has been shown to emanate from regulation that is not clearly articulated.164 
In addition, Hamburg’s timeline does not give the FDA adequate time to build 
on the lessons learned from implementation of the previous regulations since it 
gives the same deadline for the promulgation of all the final regulations.165 By 
requiring this, the court denies the FDA the opportunity to learn from the 
implementation of different aspects of this new and complex law, and ability of the 
FDA to use its’ expertise in promulgating the regulations.166 In doing this, Hamburg 
increases the likelihood that the FDA’s regulations will be poorly written, which 
adversely affects businesses.167 
There are a number of reasons that it is important to allow time for agencies to 
learn from previous regulations that have been implemented. The first reason is 
that although regulations can seem clear when they are first written, 
implementation can prove to be more difficult.168 Accordingly, agencies should 
learn from the successes and failures of past regulation169 to ensure the best possible 
 
 163. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 149, at 566–67 (Relaying a story of when the Environmental Protection 
Agency was forced to implement regulations in a shorter time frame than requested which resulted in 
scientifically flawed and sham regulations); Abbott, supra note 145, at 467, 469, 472–74, 476, 480–81, 487 
(Providing numerous examples of how court-ordered deadlines have led to poorly written rules.). 
 164. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Conclusion, Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of the Impact of 
Reregulation and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47 ADMIN L. REV. 665, 666 (1995) (reiterating 
an incident where the Internal Revenue Service’s poorly-written regulation contributed to a number of 
businesses adopting costly compliance plans). 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 59–62. 
 166. Before Hamburg, the FDA had decided to prioritize the development and implementation of FSMA’s 
regulations due to the agency’s limited resources. Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Ctr. for Food 
Safety v. Hamburg, No. 12-cv-04529 PJH, 2013 WL 781073 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013). By forcing the FDA to 
implement the regulations on a strict timeline that does not allow for prioritizing regulations to be 
implemented, the Hamburg court is not adequately deferring to the agency’s expertise with these complex 
regulations. See Papago Tribal Utility Authority v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that 
courts defer to an agency’s substantial expertise where the subject matter is complex); infra note 172. 
 167. See, e.g., HB 424 – Regulation Review, 23rd Leg. 1081 (2004) (statement of David Stancliff, representing 
Sen. Therriault), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?session=23&beg_line=01 
376&end_line=01592&time=1320&date=20040227&comm=JUD&house=H (stating how poorly-written 
regulation can cost millions of dollars and it is difficult for someone affected by such to obtain resolution); 
Patrick J. DeSouza, Note, Regulating Fraud in Military Procurement: A Legal Process Model, 95 YALE L.J. 390, 
404–05, n.4 (1985) (stating how poorly written regulation is an element of mismanagement, which leads to 
adverse effects to contractors, such as forcing them to pay an insurance premium and causing their 
exploitation).  
 168. One example of this is the regulation emanating from the Clean Air Act of 1990. Despite the law being 
carefully scrutinized and debated for a decade and carefully thought out by a well-funded EPA, the regulation 
was difficult to implement. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New 
Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1692 (1991); Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1724 (1991). 
 169. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (stating 
that decision depended on federal agency being able to change regulatory approach to reflect past experiences). 
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product both for the sake of the agency and the food industry.170 The second reason 
is that allowing the FDA to build on its lessons from previous regulations will help 
allay any industry anxiety and help it better prepare for newer FSMA regulations. 
One of the reasons the food industry is particularly anxious about FSMA is that it is 
an unknown comprehensive legislation.171 This effect is likely to be exacerbated 
since the regulation is so complex and novel, and there is so much discretion left to 
the FDA.172 Allowing the food industry to see a successful implementation of some 
of FSMA’s regulations will not only allow the food industry to better prepare, but 
will let it see that the regulation could be implemented successfully.173 
Hamburg is specifically detrimental to the investing and marketing decisions and 
successes of the affected businesses. As noted with environmental regulation, a 
stable regulatory environment is critical for investing and marketing success of 
businesses.174 Since FSMA changes the regulation of the food industry so drastically, 




 170. The reason for this is that poorly-written regulations can adversely affect industry and the agency itself. 
See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 71–74 (1983) (listing the 
agency benefits to constructing clear rules); supra note 167 and accompanying text.  
 171. See, e.g., Cookson Beecher, Proposed Rule for Food Processors Alarms Some, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 29, 
2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/07/proposed-rule-for-food-processors-alarms-some-confuses- 
many/#.UtBQlmRDvF8 (describing the proposed FSMA rule as “complicated and interwoven,” and “coming 
down like a ton of bricks,” and eliciting confusion); Sudhakar Kaup, New Survey of Processing Companies 
Reveals Uncertainty of FSMA Implications, FOOD SAFETY MAGAZINE (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.foodsafety 
magazine.com/fsm-edigest/new-survey-of-processing-companies-reveals-uncertainty-of-fsma-implications/ 
(stating that survey of food processors reveal uncertainty as biggest concern surrounding FSMA). 
 172. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12–4529 PJH 2013 WL 1741816, at *3, *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
22, 2013) (stating that the FSMA regulations are novel and complex and naming all the areas where the FDA has 
discretion).  
 173. A study of reasons industry does not comply with EPA regulations show a lack of preparation as 
contributing to the top reasons. EPA & CHEM. MFR. ASS’N, EPA/CMA Root Cause Analysis Pilot Project: An 
Industry Survey, EPA-305-R-99-001 (May 1999). Environmental regulations provide a good comparison to 
FSMA since both industries are heavily regulated by federal agencies and are closely-related to each other. See 
e.g., FDA Issues Proposed Regulations for Safer Fruits and Vegetables, CCH DRUG & COSMETICS L. REPORTER 2013 
WL 6084205 (Jan. 16, 2013) (stating that environmental groups commented on proposed FSMA regulations, 
and environmental standards and agencies were taken into account when developing FSMA regulations); Stuart 
Phillips & Hal F. Morris, The Care and Feeding of State Regulators in Chapter 11 Cases, AM. BANKR. L.J. 8, 58 
(2003) (acknowledging the environmental industry as being heavily regulated); Sudhakar Kaup, New Survey of 
Processing Companies Reveals Uncertainty of FSMA Implications, FOOD SAFETY MAGAZINE (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/fsm-edigest/new-survey-of-processing-companies-reveals-uncertainty-of-
fsma-implications/ (implying that food industry is heavily regulated). 
 174. See e.g., William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for Climate 
Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 35 (2010); supra note 166. 
 175. The FDA calls FSMA “the most sweeping reform of our food safety laws in more than 70 years” FDA 
Food Safety Modernization Act, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/default.htm; See supra text accompanying notes 14–42. 
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V. HAMBURG’S ADVERSE EFFECTS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES IN PARTICULAR 
Although Hamburg will adversely affect the entire food industry, it stands to have a 
particularly severe effect on small businesses for two reasons. The first reason stems 
from the large amount of discretion given to the FDA in defining what a small 
business is.176 The second reason stems from Hamburg exacerbating FSMA’s 
effects.177 
A. The Negative Implications of Hamburg Stemming from the Amount of Discretion 
Given to the FDA 
The first reason for the adverse effects of Hamburg on small businesses is that the 
FDA has too much discretion to define what a small business is, and not enough 
time to develop a satisfactory definition. FSMA puts no limits on how the FDA 
defines a small business.178 In addition, courts normally grant broad deference to 
agency action, so it is unlikely that courts will mitigate the negative effects of agency 
action.179 
The first problem with so much deference given to the FDA in this area is that 
there is nothing barring the FDA from making the definition of a small business 
overly expansive. As it stands, federal agencies can define small businesses as having 
up to 500 employees and a sales volume of over $35 million.180 Due to the FSMA 
exemptions for small businesses, it is in the best interest of businesses to be 
qualified as such. Since larger businesses have easier access to regulators and 
lawmakers, more clout, and greater resources, it is likely they will be able to lobby 
for a more expansive definition of a small business.181 Shorter time frames give 
smaller businesses less time to lobby for a more restrictive definition. If larger 
businesses are able to be put into the small business category, any small business 
protections are eradicated.182 Although there is a separate category for very small 
businesses, because there is no definition set-aside for them either, a similar 
phenomenon could happen with this category.183 
 
 176. See infra Part A.  
 177. See infra Part B. 
 178. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). 
 179. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).  
180. U.S. Small Business AdminISTRATION, Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched to North American 
Industry Classification System Codes, available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/size_table_01222014 
.pdf.180. 
 181. See, e.g., Kelly D. Brownell & Kenneth E. Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played 
Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar is Big Food?, THE MIILBANK QUARTERLY, Mar. 1, 2009, at 259, 262–63, 276. 
 182. See, e.g., Ray Baillie Trash Haling, Inc. v. Keppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708 (1973) (stating that the whole 
purpose of the enacting of a statute that protects small businesses is because they are unable to compete with 
large businesses in the marketplace).  
 183. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012). 
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A second problem with the FDA getting too much discretion in defining small 
and very small business is that the FDA could require small businesses to jump 
through hoops to get the necessary exemptions. The risk of this occurring is 
increased by the FDA having to promulgate their rules in haste.184 This not only is 
detrimental since it costs all businesses that apply time and resources, but it alters 
the playing field in favor of those best able to navigate the agency requirements-not 
necessarily those who are the best performers.185 In addition, when federal benefits 
have been intended for small business, they have lead to larger businesses being the 
beneficiaries.186 
B. The Negative Implications of Hamburg Stemming from its’ Exacerbation of FSMA’s 
Effects 
FSMA will work to the detriment of small businesses since government regulation 
in the marketplace, as a whole, more adversely affects these types of businesses.187 
This is particularly true with the food industry since regulations are tailored to the 
advantage of large businesses, which makes it more difficult for small businesses to 
gain entry into the marketplace.188 Since Hamburg exacerbates the effects of a 
specific type of regulation, it will have a particularly egregious effect on these 
businesses.189 
 
 184. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 145, at 485–86 (discussing how tight deadlines forced the Coast Guard to 
act hastily and promulgate flawed regulations).  
 185. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-425, 8(A) PROGRAM FOURTEEN INELIGIBLE FIRMS 
RECEIVED $325 MILLION IN SOLE-SOURCE AND SET-ASIDE CONTRACTS (2010) (reporting on how larger businesses 
have benefitted from protections intended for small businesses). 
 186. Since the FDA has not extensively administered exceptions for small businesses, the effects of these 
exceptions are not best seen in the food industry. See 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2011) (requiring the FDA defines small 
and very small businesses); Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers 
Facing Producers of “Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 83 (2011) (stating how vague food 
regulations leave a lot of discretion to food inspectors who end up adopting a “one-size-fits-all” approach). 
However, when looking at a federal program where there is heavy preference for small business, it is evidence 
that these preferences actually benefit the large businesses. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
10-425, 8(A) PROGRAM FOURTEEN INELIGIBLE FIRMS RECEIVED $325 MILLION IN SOLE-SOURCE AND SET-ASIDE 
CONTRACTS (2010) (reporting on how larger businesses have benefitted from protections intended for small 
businesses). 
 187. See, e.g., JOEL SALATIN, FOLKS, THIS AIN’T NORMAL 338 (1st ed. 2011) (stating that whenever regulators 
interfere with the marketplace it hurts small farmers because they don’t have the clout, manpower, or lobbying 
ability to curry favor with regulators); James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging 
Businesses, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 307, 313 (stating that regulation more adversely affects small and 
emerging businesses because of the minimum amount of work to adhere to the regulations).  
 188. See, e.g., Almonds Grown in California; Outgoing Quality Control Requirements, 72 Fed. Reg. 15031–
32 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt 981) (stating how several small businesses opposed the 
regulation on the grounds that it will put them out of businesses); JOEL SALATIN, FOLKS, THIS AIN’T NORMAL 338 
(1st ed. 2011) (stating how the regulation of the food industry results in small farmers being unable to gain 
entry into the marketplace due to regulation that is a minor nuisance to large farms strangling small farmers, 
and hostile harassment and intimidation of small food producers by food inspectors). 
 189. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
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The aforementioned disadvantages are exacerbated by Hamburg giving less time 
for businesses to prepare for FSMA’s implementation and more time for it to be in 
effect. In addition, although these changes primarily affect small businesses, they 
will harm everyone. The reason for this is that when small businesses are harmed 
the whole United States economy suffers since U.S. small businesses create most 
new jobs and employ 50% of the workforce.190 When potential consumers are out of 
work, all businesses suffer.191 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By deciding to follow a recently-developed stream of case law regarding APA 
unreasonable delay,192 Hamburg has hurt the food industry, particularly small 
businesses.193 This is as a result of the court’s deadlines,194 the content of FSMA,195 
and the erosion of basic administrative law principles.196 
 
 
 190. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT, 1 (2009).  
 191. See, e.g., Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social 
Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 363, 402 (2002).  
 192. See supra Part II–III. 
 193. See supra Part IV–V. 
 194. See supra Part IV. 
 195. See supra Part IV. 
 196. See supra Part III.C. 
